The argument for propositions from modal validity by Glick, Ephraim
The	argument	for	propositions	from	modal	validity	EPHRAIM	GLICK	
	
1.	Introduction	
	 One	of	the	central	goals	of	Propositions	is	to	argue	that	propositions	exist.	My	plan	for	the	following	is	to	explore	the	options	for	Merricks’	opponents	(let’s	just	call	them	‘nominalists’).	I’m	not	sure	whether,	in	the	end,	they	have	any	entirely	satisfactory	strategy,	but	the	discussion	will	still	be	of	some	interest.	At	least	I	hope	to	achieve	some	clarification	of	the	initial	arguments	of	the	book	and	to	prompt	Merricks	to	elaborate	on	a	few	issues.	Before	continuing,	I	should	say	that	I	found	many	other	challenging	arguments	throughout	the	book	as	well	as	much	to	agree	with.	I	focus	on	the	first	chapter	due	to	its	foundational	status	with	respect	to	the	rest	of	the	book,	but	every	chapter	is	well	worth	careful	thought	and	discussion.		
2.	Reconstructing	the	argument		 Merricks	argues	for	the	existence	of	propositions	by	appealing	to	modally	valid	arguments,	where	‘an	argument	is	modally	valid	just	in	case,	necessarily,	if	its	premises	are	true,	then	its	conclusion	is	true.’	(2015:	1)	His	reasoning	is	this:		 There	are	modally	valid	arguments.	So	there	are	the	premises	and	conclusions	of	modally	valid	arguments.	This	chapter	argues	that	those	
premises	and	conclusions	have	certain	features.	For	example,	they	exist	necessarily,	have	their	truth	conditions	essentially,	and	are	the	fundamental	bearers	of	truth	and	falsity.	I	shall,	with	good	reason,	call	them	‘propositions’.	So	there	are	propositions.	(2015:	1)		Despite	this	presentation	of	the	argument,	it	seems	that	Merricks	does	not	ultimately	want	to	rely	on	the	first	premise	in	the	passage.	He	writes:			 [T]his	chapter	will	build	on	the	claim	that	there	are	premises	whose	truth	necessitates	the	truth	of	certain	conclusions.	I	do	not	make	the	added	assumption	that	those	premises	and	conclusion	compose	some	further	entity,	which	further	entity	is	a	modally	valid	argument.	(2015:	4,	fn.	1)		So	Merricks’	premise	is	really	that	there	are	premises	such	that,	necessarily,	if	they	are	true,	then	certain	conclusions	are	true.	Referring	to	something	as	a	‘premise’	or	‘conclusion’	still	suggests	that	one	is	thinking	of	that	thing	as	a	part	of	an	argument,	but	what’s	really	important	for	Merricks’	purposes	is	that	we	have	some	thing	or	some	things	that	have	the	relevant	modal	relationship.	By	calling	the	former	things	‘premises’	and	the	latter	thing	a	‘conclusion’,	we	can	conveniently	distinguish	the	things	on	the	two	sides	of	the	relationship,	but	since	the	terminology	doesn’t	seem	essential	to	Merricks’	argument,	I’ll	try	to	state	the	argument	without	it.	Let’s	use	the	plural	quantiers	‘∃xx’	and	‘∀xx’	to	regiment	‘some	things’	and	‘any	things’.	So	now	a	first	pass	at	Merricks’	first	premise	would	be:	∃xx	∃y	☐(xx	are	true	→	y	is	true).	It’s	worth	noting	that	that	Merricks	does	explicitly	consider	
arguments	with	a	single	premise	and	identical	conclusion	(e.g.	at	p.	41).	If	trivial	arguments	of	that	sort	were	adequate	for	Merricks’	purposes,	we	could	try	taking	the	following	as	the	first	premise:	∃x	☐(x	is	true	→	x	is	true).	But	trivial	arguments	are	not	adequate	for	Merricks’	purposes.	For	example,	to	show	that	the	premises	and	conclusions	of	modally	valid	arguments	are	not	sentences,	Merricks	argues	roughly	as	follows	(2015:	4-6).		Consider	the	argument:	All	men	are	mortal.	Socrates	is	a	man.	Therefore,	
Socrates	is	mortal.	If	the	premises	and	conclusion	of	this	argument	were	sentences,	then,	since	it	is	contingent	that	sentences	have	the	truth-conditions	they	have,	it	would	be	possible	for	the	premises	to	be	true	while	the	conclusion	were	false.	Thus	the	argument	would	not	be	modally	valid.	But	it	is.	So	its	premises	and	conclusion	are	not	sentences.	This	line	of	thought	obviously	wouldn’t	apply	to	an	argument	whose	premise	and	conclusion	were	identical.	In	fact,	it	wouldn’t	apply	to	any	argument	whose	conclusion	were	among	its	premises.	For	even	if	it	is	contingent	that	sentences	have	the	truth-conditions	they	have,	it	is	not	possible	for	a	sentence	to	be	both	true	and	false.	So	let’s	make	a	slight	revision	to	our	regimentation	of	Merrick’s	initial	premise.	To	express	that	y	is	one	of	the	xx,	we	write:	y	<	xx.	Then	the	premise	is:	∃xx	∃y	(~(y<xx)	&	☐(xx	are	true	→	y	is	true)).	To	help	fill	in	the	rest	of	the	argument,	let’s	use	‘is	F’	to	abbreviate	‘has	its	truth	conditions	essentially,	exists	necessarily,	….’,	where	this	captures	whatever	features	Merricks	takes	to	be	distinctive	of	propositions.	Here’s	what	we	get:	
 (M1) ∃xx	∃y	(~(y<xx)	&	☐(xx	are	true	→	y	is	true)).	(M2) ∀xx	∀y	((~(y<xx)	&	☐(xx	are	true	→	y	is	true))	→	xx	and	y	are	F).	
(M3) ∀x	(x	is	F	→	x	is	a	proposition).	(M4) ∃x	(x	is	a	proposition).		 In	the	discussion	below,	I	will	sometimes	follow	Merricks	in	speaking	as	if	there	are	arguments	composed	of	premises	and	conclusions,	but	(M1)	illustrates	how	such	talk	should	really	be	understood.		
3.	The	support	for	the	first	premise	
	 Let	me	distinguish	two	sorts	of	moves	that	a	nominalist	could	make	in	response	to	the	argument	(M1)-(M4).	First,	she	could	attempt	to	fully	show	how	to	explain	modal	validity	without	propositions.	Second,	she	could	attempt	to	reduce	Merricks’	challenge	to	some	more	familiar	challenge,	showing	that	if	she	can	deal	with	the	latter,	there	will	no	independent	force	left	behind	the	modal	validity	considerations.	The	latter	sort	of	response	is	obviously	more	feasible,	so	that	is	what	I	will	focus	on	here.	There	doesn’t	seem	to	me	to	be	much	interest	in	trying	to	deny	the	validity	of	the	argument,	nor	in	trying	to	deny	premise	(M3).	If	there	are	modally	valid	arguments	whose	premises	and	conclusions	have	their	truth-conditions	essentially,	exist	necessarily,	and	so	on,	then	those	premises	and	conclusions	have	a	good	claim	to	be	called	‘propositions’.	As	illustrated	by	the	Socrates-argument	above,	Merricks’	discussion	is	predominately	concerned	with	premise	(M2).	Merricks	might,	then,	expect	the	nominalist	to	object	there	and	attempt	to	undermine	the	support	for,	e.g.,	the	claim	that	premises	and	conclusions	are	entities	that	exist	necessarily.	I’ll	explore	this	strategy	below	in	connection	with	
the	notion	of	truth	at	a	world,	but	at	this	point	I	want	to	focus	instead	on	premise	(M1).	I	think	the	hardcore	nominalist	will	attempt	to	deflate	the	argument	at	the	very	beginning.	It	may	seem	crazy	to	deny	that	there	are	modally	valid	arguments,	or	rather	to	deny	that	there	are	premises	such	that	necessarily	if	they	are	true	then	certain	conclusions	are	true.	But	this	is	par	for	the	course	in	ontology.	If	Merricks	wants	to	build	his	argument	on	an	existential	claim	(as	he	puts	it	on	page	one,	‘there	are	the	premises	and	conclusions	of	modally	valid	arguments’),	it’s	only	fair	for	him	to	explain	his	support	for	that	claim.	He	writes:		 I	endorse	the	venerable	and	widespread	view	that	some	arguments	are	modally	valid.	This	is	partly	because	of	my	deference	to	the	wisdom	of	the	past	and	of	the	crowd.	And	it	is	also	because	certain	arguments	seem	to	me	to	be	obviously	modally	valid.1	(2015:	3)		While	I’m	sure	that	many	other	theorists	are	similarly	deferential,	the	appeal	to	common	opinion	is	of	limited	use	in	the	dialectical	situation	of	Merricks’	first	chapter.	Nominalism	about	propositions	is	fairly	radical,	requiring	rejection	of	very	widespread	assumptions	in	philosophy	of	language	and	mind.	And	like	other	theorists	with	controversial	views	in	ontology,	Merricks’	opponent	presumably	has	little	deference	toward	the	crowd.	Compare	an	even	more	radical	view	that	Merricks	himself	accepts:	nihilism	about	composite	objects.	
																																																								1	Related	comments	occur	earlier	(2015:	1):	“This	book’s	starting	point	is	that	there	are	some	modally	valid	arguments.	As	we	shall	see,	this	starting	point	has	an	impressive	pedigree.	Moreover,	it	is	obvious	that	certain	arguments	are	modally	valid.	Or	so	it	seems	to	me.”	
Despite	the	wisdom	of	the	past	and	of	the	crowd,	Merricks	would	say	that	if	the	realist	about	tables	wants	to	take	metaphysics	seriously,	she	needs	an	argument	that	tables	exist.	It	is	not	enough	for	her	to	say	that	it’s	obvious	and	that	nearly	everyone	believes	it.	So	it	seems	to	me	that	we	certainly	deserve	an	argument	for	the	substantially	more	theoretical	claim	that	there	are	premises	and	conclusions	of	modally	valid	arguments.		Let’s	turn	to	the	second	point	–	certain	arguments	seem	to	Merricks	to	be	obviously	modally	valid.	I	don’t	think	Merricks	is	taking	the	existential	claim	(M1)	itself	as	a	datum	here.	He’s	not	saying	that	it	is	obvious	that	there	exist	premises	such	that	necessarily,	if	they’re	true	then	certain	conclusions	are	true.	Rather,	he	is	reporting	a	judgment	about	particular	examples.	Immediately	following	his	report	that	certain	arguments	seem	to	him	to	be	obviously	modally	valid,	he	continues:	‘For	example:	(1)	All	men	are	mortal.	(2)	Socrates	is	a	man.	Therefore,	(3)	Socrates	is	mortal.’	The	premises	and	the	conclusion	seem	to	Merricks	to	be	obviously	such	that	necessarily	if	the	former	are	true	then	the	latter	is	true.	The	nominalist	can’t	plausibly	respond	by	simply	rejecting	Merricks’	judgment	without	further	comment.	There	is	indeed	something	obvious	there.	The	question	is,	what	exactly	is	obvious?	Necessarily,	if	all	men	are	mortal	and	Socrates	is	a	man,	then	Socrates	is	mortal.	Obviously.	The	nominalist	will	agree.	But	on	the	face	of	it,	propositions	haven’t	yet	gotten	into	the	picture	at	all,	and	we	have	yet	to	connect	the	obvious	datum	to	Merricks’	premise	(M1).	There	are	two	(related)	respects	in	which	(M1)	goes	beyond	what	the	nominalist	has	so	far	agreed	to.	First,	(M1)	involves	truth	–	if	the	xx	are	true,	then	
y	is	true.	Second,	(M1)	involves	objectual	quantification	over	things	that	we	informally	describe	as	premises	and	conclusions.		To	ease	discussion,	let’s	name	the	thesis	that	everyone	agrees	is	obvious:			 (a) Necessarily,	if	all	men	are	mortal	and	Socrates	is	a	man,	then	Socrates	is	mortal.		I	think	the	nominalist	would	press	the	following	thoughts:	While	(a)	is	obvious,	(M1)	is	not.	Rather,	(M1)	requires	support.	And	it	does	not	follow	from	(a).	So	granting	(a)	does	not	immediately	require	granting	(M1).	The	nominalist	is	right	at	least	in	that	Merricks’	premise	(M1)	is	significantly	less	obvious	than	(a).	And	(a)	doesn’t	appear	to	have	any	singular	terms	over	which	one	could	existentially	generalize	to	get	(M1)	(or	a	natural-language	version	of	M1),	so	it	also	seems	fair	to	press	the	question	of	how	Merricks	would	propose	to	get	(M1)	from	(a).	I	imagine	that	the	answer	would	involve	(b)	or	(c)	below.			 (b) Necessarily,	if	it	is	true	that	all	men	are	mortal	and	it	is	true	that	Socrates	is	a	man,	then	it	is	true	that	Socrates	is	mortal.	(c) Necessarily,	if	that	all	men	are	mortal	is	true	and	that	Socrates	is	a	man	is	true,	then	that	Socrates	is	mortal	is	true.		Perhaps	(b)	and	(c)	seem	as	obvious	as	(a),	although	I’m	not	sure	about	this.	(Actually,	to	my	ear,	(c)	is	barely	English.)	Regardless	of	whether	they	are	obvious,	(b)/(c)	look	like	perfect	intermediaries	for	reaching	(M1)	from	(a).	The	
obvious	problem	with	(a)	was	that	it	didn’t	appear	to	have	any	singular	terms	over	which	one	could	existentially	generalize.	The	problem	appears	rectified	by	(c).	The	trick	is	the	introduction	of	‘true’.	Since	singular	terms,	when	they	occur,	must	occur	as	arguments	of	predicates,	one	needs	to	introduce	some	predicates	to	turn	(a)	into	a	claim	that	appears	to	have	such	singular	terms.	Hence,	‘true’	in	(b)/(c).	What	then,	should	the	nominalist	say	about	(b)/(c)	and	their	relationship	to	(a)	and	(M1)?	In	the	next	section	I	will	make	some	suggestions,	but	for	now,	notice	that	the	apparent	entailment	of	(M1)	by	(b)/(c)	is	an	example	of	a	familiar	problem	for	nominalism.	There	are	English	sentences	in	which	that-clauses	appear	to	be	terms	over	which	one	can	existentially	generalize.	For	instance,	here	is	a	very	familiar	sort	of	argument:	John	believes	that	cats	meow.	That	cats	
meow	is	true.	So,	John	believes	something	true.	I	don’t	have	anything	new	to	say	about	such	arguments.2	What	I	want	to	point	out	is	just	that	adjudicating	the	dispute	between	Merricks	and	the	nominalist	ultimately	requires	evaluating	various	possible	responses	to	the	existential	generalization	employed	in	Merricks	argument,	just	like	in	the	belief-argument	and	in	similar	arguments	concerning	various	other	putative	abstracta.	So	if	the	nominalist	has	a	decent	strategy	for	responding	to	these	more	familiar	arguments	for	the	existence	of	propositions,	then	she	already	has	a	decent	strategy	for	responding	to	Merricks	without	even	tackling	(M2)	or	(M3).		
4.	Strategies	for	the	nominalist	 	
																																																								2	For	recent	discussion,	see	the	opening	chapters	of	King,	Soames,	and	Speaks	(2014).	
	 Having	argued	that	the	challenge	posed	by	Merricks’	argument	is	a	challenge	of	a	familiar	sort,	I	now	want	to	sketch	some	ways	in	which	the	nominalist	might	respond	to	that	sort	of	challenge.	I	hope	this	will	prompt	Merricks	to	offer	his	views	on	some	issues	about	quantification	and	ontology	that	don’t	get	discussed	in	the	book.		We	can	begin	by	noting	that	a	familiar	response	to	anti-nominalist	arguments	involving	existential	generalization	is	to	question	the	ontological	import	of	the	introduced	quantifier.	A	nominalist	could	say	that	while	‘There	are	modally	valid	arguments’	or	‘There	are	premises…’	is	correct,	it	is	correct	only	in	a	noncommital	sense	of	‘there	are’.	Merricks,	I	assume,	wants	to	establish	a	substantive	ontological	conclusion,	but	if,	say,	a	substitutional	quantifier	were	the	correct	tool	for	interpreting	‘There	are	premises…’,	then	Merricks’	starting	point	would	be	unhelpful.	There	are	of	course	worries	about	the	limitations	of	substitutional	quantification,	but	the	general	strategy	of	deflating	the	significance	of	the	existential	quantifier	is	a	strategy	which	a	nominalist	is	likely	to	pursue,	but	which	is	not	discussed	in	Propositions.	To	make	things	a	bit	more	concrete,	consider	a	contemporary	nominalistic	strategy	developed	in	detail	by	Hofweber	(e.g.	in	his	2005).	He	argues	that	English	quantifiers	have	both	a	domain-conditions	reading	and	an	
inferential-role	reading.	On	the	former	reading,	quantifiers	are	ontologically	significant,	expressing	constraints	on	the	domain.	On	the	latter	reading,	quantifiers	don’t	express	anything	ontologically	significant,	as	they	have	a	purely	inferential	role.	The	inferential	role	of	‘something’	is	simply	this,	schematically:	‘t	is	F’	implies	‘something	is	F’,	where	‘t’	is	any	expression	of	an	appropriate	
syntactic	category.	Similarly	for	the	inferential	role	of	‘everything’:	‘everything	is	F’	implies	‘t	is	F’.	(Whether	‘t	is	F’	is	ontologically	significant	may	still	require	investigation,	of	course.)		Hofweber’s	idea	applies	to	the	sentences	Merricks	uses	to	argue	for	the	existence	of	propositions.	Take	the	inference	from	(b)/(c)	to	(M1)	or	its	English	version.	The	nominalist	needn’t	deny	that	this	is	a	good	inference	in	order	to	defend	nominalism.	Instead,	she	can	say:	On	an	inferential	role	reading,	‘There	are	premises…’	really	is	implied	by	(b)/(c).	But	if	Merricks	wants	an	ontologically	weighty	premise,	that	isn’t	it.	The	ontologically	weighty	premise	would	involve	a	domain-conditions	reading	of	the	quantified	claim,	and	that	reading	is	not	implied	by	(b)/(c).	Merricks	hasn’t	provided	an	adequate	reason	to	think	that	his	initial	data	support	the	premise	he	really	needs.	This,	anyway,	is	the	line	that	Hofweber’s	work	would	suggest.		 A	related	strategy	for	responding	to	(M1)	is	to	appeal	to	some	notion	of	fundamentality	and	say	that	what	really	matters	to	ontology	is	not	what	exists,	but	what	is	fundamental.	Even	if	the	existence	of	propositions	follows	from	(a)	and	(b)/(c),	this	isn’t	a	metaphysically	heavyweight	conclusion.	For	it	is	compatible	with	saying	that	propositions	‘are	not	part	of	the	ultimate	furniture	of	reality’	(Dorr	2008:	34).	The	way	Dorr	pursues	this	line,	it	looks	like	a	version	of	the	nominalistic	strategy	of	deflating	the	significance	of	the	quantifier.	He	distinguishes	superficial	from	fundamental	uses	of	‘exists’	and	‘there	are’,	arguing	that	while	there	are	numbers,	properties,	etc.	in	a	superficial	sense,	‘in	the	final	analysis,	[there	are]	no	such	things’	(2008:	34).	The	same	would	apply	to	the	premises	and	conclusions	of	modally	valid	arguments.	Alongside	Dorr’s	approach,	there	are	other	ways	of	explaining	the	general	
strategy:	One	could	say	that	while	such	premises	and	conclusions	exist,	they	don’t	really	exist,	or	say	that	their	existence	is	grounded	in	nominalistically	acceptable	materials,	or	say	that	sentences	like	‘There	are	premises	…’	have	
metaphysical	truth-conditions	that	only	concern	non-propositions.	Any	fundamentality-based	response	to	Merricks	of	the	sort	just	sketched	would	need	to	be	filled	out	in	greater	detail,	obviously,	and	this	would	be	difficult.	(How	might	the	existence	of	propositions	be	grounded	in	materials	friendly	to	nominalists?	What	exactly	are	the	metaphysical	truth-conditions	of	proposition-involving	talk?	And	so	on.)	But	given	the	contemporary	influence	of	these	approaches	to	ontology	and	given	the	(to	my	mind)	even	more	nominalistically-friendly	approach	from	Hofweber,	I	think	a	pressing	question	for	Merricks	is	how	he	wants	to	convince	his	opponents	that	he	is	entitled	to	an	ontologically	heavyweight	interpretation	of	his	first	premise,	(M1).	The	initial	data	such	as	(a)	don’t	immediately	support	such	a	premise.	But	more	generally,	I’d	be	interested	in	hearing	Merricks’	take	on	some	of	these	approaches	and	how	they	relate	to	his	argument.	Here	is	one	further,	vaguely	related	idea	about	(b)/(c).	If	one	has	a	deflationary	attitude	toward	propositional	truth,	one	might	take	the	introduction	of	‘true’	and	nominalisation	of	the	premises	and	conclusion	to	be	little	help	in	supporting	(M1).	Suppose,	for	instance,	that	one	adopted	the	redundancy	theory	of	propositional	truth,	holding	that	for	the	proposition	that	Socrates	is	mortal	to	be	true	is	just	for	Socrates	to	be	mortal.	This	isn’t	a	very	popular	view	these	days	(although	David	Lewis	(2001a,	2001b)	seems	to	be	sympathetic3),	but	let’s	
																																																								3	According	to	Lewis	(2001a:	602),	‘The	truth	about	truth,	so	far	as	propositions	are	concerned,	is	a	long	but	simple	story,’	involving	no	more	than	a	pattern	of	
consider	it	briefly	to	make	a	point.	According	to	the	redundancy	theory,	(b)/(c)	don’t	say	anything	more	than	(a).	They	all	simply	say	that	necessarily,	if	Socrates	is	a	man	and	all	men	are	mortal,	then	Socrates	is	mortal.	It	is	very	hard	to	see	why	that	would	directly	entitle	us	to	(M1),	for	as	noted	earlier,	(a)	looks	like	it	doesn’t	concern	truth-bearers	at	all.	It	just	constrains	the	possibilities	concerning	mortality,	men,	and	Socrates.	So	again,	for	his	argument	to	defeat	nominalism,	Merricks	would	need	to	fill	in	the	gap	between	(a)	and	(M1).		While	Merricks	could	reply	that	he	has	independent	reasons	to	reject	a	redundancy	theory	of	truth,	the	above	point	is	still	of	interest.	First,	it	at	least	illustrates	another	commitment	needed	to	get	to	(M1)	from	the	initial	intuitive	data	such	as	(a).	And	second,	it	thereby	illustrates	a	contrast	between	Merricks’	argument	and	other	arguments	for	the	existence	of	propositions.	Take	this	argument:	John	believes	that	cats	meow.	So,	there	is	something	John	believes.	(Further	argument	would	then	be	used	to	establish	a	premise	analogous	to	Merricks’	(M2)	–	things	that	are	believed	must	have	certain	properties	making	them	deserving	of	being	called	‘propositions’.)	What	can	the	nominalist	say	in	reply?	Well,	no	one	thinks	that	John’s	believing	that	cats	meow	consists	in	its	being	the	case	that	cats	meow.	(One	might	still,	of	course,	try	some	other	strategy	for	rejecting	a	relational	analysis	of	attitude	attributions.)	So	perhaps	the	belief	argument	can	avoid	a	challenge	that	could	be	pressed	against	the	modal	validity	argument.	A	third	and	final,	more	tentative	idea	is	that	even	if	the	redundancy	theory	is	wrong,	other	deflationary	accounts	of	truth	might	raise	similar	challenges.	For	inspiration,	here	is	a	suggestion	Horwich	makes	in	passing:																																																																																																																																																															trivial,	necessary,	and	a	priori	biconditionals	such	as:	The	proposition	that	pigs	fly	
is	true	iff	pigs	fly.	In	Lewis	2001b	these	are	called	‘redundancy	biconditionals’.	For	discussion,	see	Bricker	(2015:	168).		
‘[O]ne	might	take	the	fact	that	The	proposition	that	dogs	bark	is	true	to	consist	in	the	fact	that	Dogs	bark.’	(Meaning	178)	If	(eliminating	the	fact-talk)	the	proposition	that	dogs	bark	being	true	just	consists	in	dogs	barking,	Merricks	faces	a	question	similar	to	the	question	raised	by	the	redundancy	theorist:	Why	would	the	existential	(M1)	follow	from	something	that	just	consisted	in	dogs	barking?	That	would	be	puzzling,	the	nominalist	would	urge.	If	Merricks	wants	(M1),	then	even	if	his	deflationary	opponent	grants	the	datum	(a),	more	would	need	to	be	said	about	how	dogs	barking	could	already	ensure	that	there	are	truth-bearers	that	are	modally	related	in	a	certain	way.		
5.	The	second	premise	and	truth	at	a	world			 So	far	I’ve	been	exploring	how	someone	might	deny	that	there	are	premises	such	that	necessarily	if	they’re	true	then	certain	conclusions	are	true.	At	this	point	I	want	to	move	on	to	(M2),	the	claim	that	any	such	premises	and	conclusions	would	have	various	features	that	would	preclude	their	being	sentences.	It	is	here	that	Merricks	anticipates	the	strongest	objection.	The	central	challenge	he	considers	is	the	following:	Once	we	distinguish	between	truth	in	a	world	and	truth	at	a	world,	we	can	see	a	way	to	maintain	that	sentences	are	the	premises	and	conclusions	of	modally	valid	arguments.	Basically,	an	argument	is	modally	valid	iff	for	any	world	w,	if	its	premises	are	true	at	w,	then	its	conclusion	is	true	at	w.	Merricks’	reply	is	that	this	explanation	of	modal	validity	fails	to	capture	a	desired	modal	connection	–	‘the	claim	that	an	argument’s	conclusion	is	true	at	all	possible	worlds	at	which	its	premises	are	true	does	not	imply	that	
there	is	any	modal	connection	between	the	truth	of	its	conclusion	and	the	truth	of	its	premises’	(p.	16).	But	what	is	the	desired	modal	connection	and	why	does	truth-at	not	supply	it?	Let	S1,	S2,	and	S3	respectively	be	the	sentences	‘All	men	are	mortal’,	‘Socrates	is	a	man’,	and	‘Socrates	is	mortal’.	Merricks	notes	that	while,	for	any	w,	S3	is	true	at	w	iff	Socrates	is	mortal	in	w,	‘S3’s	having	the	same	truth	conditions	at	all	possible	worlds	does	not	imply	that	S3	has	its	truth	conditions	essentially.	[…]	Indeed,	S3	has	the	same	truth	conditions	at	all	possible	worlds	regardless	of	the	modal	status	of	S3’s	having	those	truth	conditions.’	(p.	15)	Extending	the	point	to	the	relationship	between	premises	and	conclusions,	we	see	that	even	if	S3	is	true	at	every	world	at	which	S1and	S2	are	true,	we’re	nevertheless	not	able	to	conclude	that	S3	is	essentially	such	that	it’s	true	if	S1	and	S2	are	true	(p.	16).		Why	the	use	of	‘essentially’?	As	Merricks	is	no	doubt	aware,	it’s	widely	accepted	these	days	that	necessary	properties	of	a	thing	needn’t	be	essential	properties	of	it.	And	from	page	one	modal	validity	has	been	explained	in	terms	of	what’s	necessary.	Recall	that	‘an	argument	is	modally	valid	just	in	case,	necessarily,	if	its	premises	are	true,	then	its	conclusion	is	true.’	(p.	1)	So	let’s	set	aside	questions	about	the	essential	properties	of	sentences.	The	real	issue	is	whether	S1	and	S2	can	be	such	that	necessarily,	if	they’re	true	then	S3	is	true.	Merricks	opponent	says	that	they	are,	provided	we	understand	truth	properly.	So	what’s	the	problem?	Merricks	elaborates	after	his	claim	about	essentiality:		 More	generally,	S3	is	true	at	all	possible	worlds	at	which	S1	and	S2	are	true	regardless	of	what—if	any—modal	connection	there	is	between,	on	
the	one	hand,	S3’s	being	true	and,	on	the	other,	S1’s	being	true	and	S2’s	being	true.	All	of	this	shows—perhaps	surprisingly—that	the	claim	that	S3	is	true	at	all	possible	worlds	at	which	S1	and	S2	are	true	is	not	a	claim	about	any	modal	connection	between	the	truth	of	S3	and	the	truth	of	S1	and	S2.	(p.	16)		But	it’s	still	not	clear	what	the	objection	is	to	the	truth-at	analysis	of	modal	validity.	The	proponent	of	the	latter	has	two	key	ideas:	Modal	talk	can	be	analyzed	in	terms	of	quantification	over	worlds,	and	truth	can	be	understood	as	either	truth-in-a-world	or	truth-at-a-world.	With	these	tools,	the	theorist	claims	to	be	able	to	give	a	true	analysis	of	the	claim	that	necessarily,	if	S1	and	S2	are	true	then	S3	is	true.	And	that	she	does,	since	she	analyzes	this	as	meaning	that	for	any	world	w,	if	S1	and	S2	are	true	at	w,	then	S3	is	true	at	w,	and	that	claim	is	correct.	She	can	similarly	give	a	false	analysis	of	the	claim	that	possibly,	S1	and	S2	are	true	while	S3	is	false:	There	is	some	world	w	such	that	S1	and	S2	are	true	at	w	while	S3	is	false	at	w.	The	truth-at	theorist	has	accommodated	(M1),	showing	how	sentences	can	be	the	witnesses	for	the	quantifiers,	without	committing	herself	to	(M2)	–	sentences	don’t	have	their	conditions	essentially	or	exist	necessarily.		Merricks	wants	to	insist	that	on	the	truth-at	analysis,	no	modal	connection	between	premises	and	conclusions	has	been	captured.	But	the	truth-at	theorist	should	simply	say	that	the	following	is	a	modal	connection:	Necessarily,	if	the	premises	are	true,	then	the	conclusion	is	true.	It	looks	to	me	like	Merricks	must	either	reject	the	analysis	of	modals	in	terms	of	quantifiers	over	worlds,	reject	the	claim	that	‘true’	can	be	interpreted	as	true-at,	or	reject	
what	he	previously	offered	as	an	explanation	of	modal	validity	(the	argument	from	premises	to	conclusion	is	modally	valid	iff	necessarily,	if	the	premises	are	true,	then	the	conclusion	is	true).	Neither	of	the	first	two	strategies	seems	to	be	what	Merricks	attempts	in	the	passages	cited	above,	although	later	(2015:	115)	he	indicates	that	he	does	want	to	avoid	any	talk	of	possible	worlds	in	explaining	modal	validity	(this	is	for	reasons	related	to	temporalism	about	propositions,	which	I	don’t	have	space	to	discuss	here).	The	third	strategy	would	be	unexpected	in	light	of	the	opening	of	the	book,	especially	given	Merricks’	deference	to	the	wisdom	of	the	crowd	–	the	crowd	tells	us	that	modal	validity	is	precisely	what	Merricks	says	it	is	on	page	one.	So	I	am	puzzled	and	hope	Merricks	could	offer	a	clarification	of	his	objection	to	the	truth-at	analysis	of	modal	validity.	The	book’s	other	main	discussion	of	truth-at	occurs	during	Merricks’	argument	that	the	premises	and	conclusions	of	modally	valid	arguments	exist	necessarily.	His	reasoning	is	simply	this:	Some	arguments	have	premises	or	conclusions	that	are	necessarily	true	(or	necessarily	false).	And	‘Necessarily,	if	a	premise	(conclusion)	is	true,	then	it	exists.’	(2015:	18)	So	some	premises	or	conclusions	exist	necessarily.	The	point	of	the	argument	is	that,	since	sentences	exist	contingently,	we	would	have	another	reason	to	deny	that	sentences	are	the	premises	of	modally	valid	arguments.		I	think	Merricks	is	right	to	expect	another	objection	from	the	truth-at	theorist.	He	imagines	her	responding	that	necessary	truth	is	truth	at	every	possible	world,	and	something	that	exists	only	in	some	worlds	can	be	true	at	every	world.	Here	is	his	reply	to	this	line:		
[L]et	S	be	a	sentence	whose	truth	conditions	are	satisfied	in	all	possible	worlds.	Then	S	is	true	at	all	possible	worlds.	S	could	have	had	different	truth	conditions.	So	S	could	have	been	false.	So	the	claim	that	necessary	truth	is	truth	at	all	possible	worlds	yields	the	result	that	some	necessary	truths	could	have	been	false.	I	think	that	result	is	mistaken.	So	I	deny	that	necessary	truth	is	truth	at	all	possible	worlds.	(2015:	18)		Here	Merricks	reasons	that	since	‘All	dogs	are	dogs’	could	have	had	different	truth-conditions	(say,	by	meaning	that	no	dogs	are	dogs),	it	could	have	been	false.	The	truth-at	theorist	can	agree,	offering	the	following	interpretation	of	the	reasoning:4	Since	there	is	some	world	w	such	that	‘All	dogs	are	dogs’	has	different	truth-conditions	in	w	than	it	does	in	the	actual	world,	there	is	some	world	w	such	that	‘All	dogs	are	dogs’	is	false	in	w.	But	then	Merricks	wants	to	force	his	opponent	to	combine	this	conclusion	with	the	claim	that	‘All	dogs	are	dogs’	is	necessarily	true.	The	acceptable	interpretation	of	the	latter	is,	on	his	opponent’s	proposal,	that	for	every	possible	world	w,	‘All	dogs	are	dogs’	is	true	
at	w.	On	neither	the	true-in	nor	true-at	interpretation	of	possible	truth	would	his	opponent	grant	the	conjunction	that	‘All	dogs	are	dogs’	is	necessarily	true	and	could	have	been	false.	Of	course,	the	conjunction	is	correct	if	one	uses	different	notions	of	truth	in	the	two	conjuncts.	But	why	would	we	do	that?	One	of	the	truth-at	theorist’s	points	is	that	there	is	a	danger	of	equivocation	when	we	talk	about	possible	truth	or	falsity.	If	we	avoid	equivocation,	the	combined	claim	Merricks	rejects	is	rejected	by	his	opponents	as	well.	But	both	conjuncts	can	
																																																								4	Let’s	ignore	the	reification	of	truth-conditions	for	the	moment	to	focus	on	other	matters.	See	below.	
separately	be	given	true	analyses.	So	the	truth-at	theorist	seems	to	me	safe	from	Merricks	objection.	I	conclude	that	the	distinction	between	truth	in	a	world	and	truth	at	a	world	offers	more	powerful	responses	to	Merricks’	arguments	than	he	admits.	But	the	overall	viability	of	the	truth-at	strategy	for	the	nominalist	is	not	obvious	to	me.	I’m	not	sure,	for	instance,	how	exactly	truth-at	should	be	explained.	Merricks	(2015:	14)	glosses	it	by	saying	that	‘a	premise	or	conclusion	is	true	at	a	possible	world	just	in	case	that	premise	or	conclusion	actually	has	truth	conditions	and,	necessarily,	if	that	possible	world	were	actual,	then	those	truth	conditions	would	be	satisfied.’	But	someone	who	rejects	the	existence	of	propositions	might	well	be	unhappy	with	the	reification	of	truth-conditions	here.	Is	there	some	way	to	eliminate	that	feature	of	the	explanation	of	truth-at?	I’m	not	sure.	But	other	explanations	in	the	literature	are	even	more	unhelpful	to	the	nominalist.	It	would	be	a	disaster	dialectically,	for	instance,	if	she	followed	Plantinga,	who	says	that	‘a	sentence	token	t	is	true	at	a	world	W	if	and	only	if	t	expresses	a	proposition	true	in	W’	(p.	325).		An	alternative	way	to	explain	truth-at	would	be	by	using	some	sort	of	schema.	Take	the	following,	for	example	(let	‘S’	be	replaced	with	an	assertoric	sentence):	‘S’	is	true	at	w	iff	in	w,	S.	This	obviously	would	need	refinement	due	to	context-sensitivity	and	so	on,	but	it	points	in	a	better	direction	insofar	as	it	lets	the	nominalist	avoid	referring	to	or	quantifying	over	propositions	or	truth-conditions.	I	don’t	know	whether	in	the	end	such	a	schema	could	be	refined	in	a	
totally	satisfactory	way,	but	I	will	have	to	leave	exploration	of	that	issue	for	others.5			
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